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Many people now accept that nonhuman animals have morally significant interests.1 
This is illustrated by public support for animal welfare legislation and the widespread 
condemnation of individuals and corporations who treat animals cruelly. Among 
philosophers, nearly all agree that making animals suffer unnecessarily is morally 
impermissible. Yet in thinking about exactly what we owe to other animals, most 
people still rely on a relatively simplistic picture about animals and the kinds of 
interests they possess. Roughly, on this picture, when animals have the capacity to 
experience pains (such as the physical discomfort of being cut or burned) and 
pleasures (such as eating a delicious meal), they have morally significant interests in 
avoiding such pains and in experiencing such pleasures, and we have pro tanto reasons 
to satisfy those interests.  
Recently, however, animal rights theorists have begun to advance a more 
ambitious claim: that many sentient animals also possess important agency interests. 
For instance, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka suggest that 
 
[Many animals] have the need and desire to exercise control in 
their lives—not just to make temporally localized decisions … 
about when to eat or to sleep, but also significant decisions about 
the general shape and structure of their lives … concerning 
where and how they live; who they mate with, live with and 
associate with; what sorts of activities they learn about, engage 
in, and pursue mastery of.2 
                                                        
1 From this point on we use the term ‘animal’ to refer to nonhuman animals. Though convenient, this 
decision has two negative consequences that must be noted. First, it implies that humans are not 
animals, which of course we are. Second, it obscures the diversity that exists between different 
animals. See further fn. 5.  
2 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, “Comment: Between Wild and Domesticated: Rethinking 
Categories and Boundaries in Response to Animal Agency” in Animal Ethics in the Age of Humans, eds. 
B. Bovenkerk and J. Keulartz (Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2016): 225-238 at p. 235. See also, Sue 





On this view, animals’ agency interests are not reducible to their interests in avoiding 
pain and experiencing pleasure. Rather, they are interests in being able to shape their 
interactions with others and choose for themselves what activities to pursue and how 
to spend their time. According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, these interests place us 
under duties of justice to create social conditions that will enable and facilitate the 
agency of those domesticated animals with whom we live, in order to give them 
greater control over their own lives. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka claim that 
respect for animal agency and self-determination is “the first principle of interspecies 
justice.”3 
If correct, these claims have significant theoretical and practical implications 
for the understanding and realisation of social justice. However, while Donaldson and 
Kymlicka offer a forceful articulation of the guiding idea, they do little to specify 
either (i) the precise nature of animals’ agency interests, or (ii) the precise nature of 
the normative relations that hold between us in virtue of these interests. The absence 
of a more detailed account poses two problems. On the one hand, it deepens the 
scepticism of those who doubt that animals possess normatively significant agency 
interests. On the other, it makes it difficult for those who are more sympathetic to 
work out what exactly respecting animal agency entails. 
In this article, we respond to these problems by developing and defending an 
account of the normative significance of animal agency. In particular, we focus on how 
animals’ agential capacities, and their concomitant agency interests, impact upon the 
moral permissibility of human interactions with them. As a first step, we argue that 
in virtue of their agential capacities, animals sometimes have rights to self-
determination (Section I). Drawing on recent discussions of paternalism, we interpret 
such claims as claims to have one’s will recognised as normatively authoritative 
within particular domains of activity. We then argue that many animals have 
significant interests in determining the course of their own lives within particular 
spheres, and that they can sometimes be competent decision-makers within these 
domains. When these two conditions are met, they have justified claims to self-
determination. 
                                                        
Press, 2011); Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka “Farmed Animal Sanctuaries: The Heart of the 
Movement?”, Animals and Politics 1 (2015): 50-74; Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, “Rethinking 
Membership and Participation in an Inclusive Democracy: Cognitive Disability, Children, Animals” 
in Disability and Political Theory, eds. Barbara Arneil and Nancy Hirschmann (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016): 168-197. 




However, this gives rise to a puzzle about the moral permissibility of many 
forms of interaction between humans and animals. In the context of adult human 
relations, the power of consent plays a crucial role in enabling interaction while 
respecting one another’s agency and autonomy. Generally speaking, our autonomy 
rights set boundaries upon the ways in which others are permitted to interact with us. 
For example, a person would usually violate your rights if they performed surgery 
upon you or had sex with you. However, you can shape and alter these normative 
boundaries, and allow these interactions, by giving your consent to surgeons and 
sexual partners.  
If animals sometimes have claims to self-determination, how might this 
requirement for consent apply to our interactions with them? For some, the centrality 
of consent to respecting one another’s agency poses no problem for human-nonhuman 
interactions, because they believe that many animals are also capable of giving and 
revoking consent.4 We argue that this is false. On plausible empirical assumptions, 
animals lack the capacity to give and withhold consent (Section II). However, the 
central reason for this is not that animals lack the information necessary to give 
informed consent, as is often suggested. Rather, it is because they cannot understand, 
form, and communicate complex intentions about normative concepts like rights and 
duties.  
This combination of claims returns us to the puzzle concerning the 
permissibility of human interactions with animals. If animals sometimes have rights 
to self-determination, but cannot give or withhold consent, then when, if ever, is it 
permissible for us to touch other animals, hold them, bathe them, confine them, or 
engage them in work or in sport? In Sections III and IV of the paper we develop a 
solution to this puzzle. We argue that although the idea of consent is unhelpful for 
thinking about just interspecies relations, two related notions show promise: assent 
and dissent. In short, we propose that an animal assents to an activity or interaction 
when they wilfully affirm it, and that their assent can enable permissible interactions 
with humans consistent with their rights to self-determination. Likewise, if they 
dissent from an activity or interaction then, so long as they are competent, they have 
a right against our interfering with them. This is an important conclusion for animal 
rights theory and interspecies justice. Indeed, by showing how human-nonhuman 
animal interactions can be consistent with animals’ claims to self-determination, the 
account presented here makes the project of interspecies justice possible.  
 
  
                                                        




I. Animal Agency and the Right to Self-Determination 
 
In this section we develop the core of our argument for the claim that animals 
sometimes have rights to self-determination.5 Our aim is not to establish that animals 
are fully autonomous and rational in the way that most adult humans are. Rather, we 
aim to defend an account of why and when animal agency is normatively significant. 
This argument will be reinforced by the discussions in Sections III and IV, and will 
serve as a basis upon which to approach the question of how animals’ agency interests 
should impact upon our thinking about how to permissibly interact with them. 
In attributing rights of self-determination to animals, we rely on the widely 
accepted idea that an individual who has a right to self-determination within a certain 
domain has a right that their will be recognised as normatively authoritative within that 
domain.6 Put simply, this means that the agent’s will ought to be regarded as decisive, 
such that it is generally impermissible for others to interfere in the agent’s choices or 
actions. For example, if you have a right to self-determination then you have the 
authority to decide whether to have another glass of wine, or pursue a doomed 
romantic relationship, or take up base jumping, despite the (sometimes serious) harms 
that these choices may bring about. In all of these cases, other agents would wrong 
you by preventing you from pursuing these options, even if they are right in thinking 
that your choices will not best promote your well-being. 
More precisely, on our view, an agent’s will is normatively authoritative within 
a domain when their will serves to silence or exclude considerations of their well-being 
from others’ practical deliberations about how to act or interact with them in that 
domain.7 Consider, for instance, what happens when a competent patient refuses to 
undergo life-saving surgery. Their communicated will does not merely give the 
surgeon one reason against medical intervention – a reason that is then to be weighed 
against other reasons, such as their interest in continuing to benefit from goods they 
would enjoy in the future were they to live. Rather, the patient’s will is authoritative, 
                                                        
5 Throughout the paper, we often make general claims about animals. We do so, despite great 
variation in the animal kingdom, to simplify the exposition of the argument. Specifying which 
animals these claims apply to would require detailed empirical work about which animals possess 
the kinds of capacities we highlight as significant. However, we suspect that these claims can be 
defended for many subjectively aware animals. 
6 See, for example, Daniel Groll, “Paternalism, Respect, and the Will,” Ethics 122, no 4 (2012): 692-720, 
at pp. 700-01; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and 
Accommodation,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 26, no. 3 (2000): 205-250.  
7 Groll, “Paternalism, Respect, and the Will,” p. 701. Here and throughout we are particularly 




and therefore serves to render appeals to the good of the patient, on the part of the 
surgeon, inadmissible. 
When an individual has a right to self-determination, then, they have the 
authority to choose how to act, and their choices place others under duties of non-
interference. For present purposes, we will assume that an agent has a right to self-
determination with regard to a particular domain or decision D when (1) they have 
an interest in determining the course of their own life with regard to D that is sufficient 
to ground duties in others,8 and (2) they are competent with regard to D. We argue 
that animals, as well as humans, can meet these conditions. Let’s consider each in turn. 
 
(1) Do animals have interests in determining the course of their own lives? 
 
It is uncontroversial that some animals have preferences and desires, and that they act 
intentionally to satisfy them.9 Those with companion animals will have first-hand 
experience of animal individuality in preferences for food, play, physical contact, 
exercise, rest, and so on. And many of us have borne witness to our companions acting 
to satisfy these preferences. More generally, evidence abounds of animals learning, 
planning, problem-solving, deceiving, cooperating, compromising, and 
communicating in order to realise their goals. For example, many animals use tools to 
acquire food,10 abide by social norms and rules in order to realize their desires for 
friendship, status, and play,11 and engage in tactical deception to secure some kind of 
                                                        
8 For this general conception of the grounds of rights see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 166. 
9 For philosophical reflections on animal cognition and agency that are relevant to the discussion of 
this section, see David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); David DeGrazia, “Self-Awareness in Animals,” in The Philosophy 
of Animal Minds, ed. Robert W. Lurz (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Fred 
Dretske, “Minimal Rationality,” in Rational Animals, eds. Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006): 107–116; Hans-Johann Glock, “Can Animals Act For Reasons?” 
Inquiry 52, no. 3 (2009): 232-254; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (updated version) (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004); Jeff Sebo, “Agency and Moral Status,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 
14, no. 1 (2017): 1-22; and Natalie Thomas, Animals Ethics and the Autonomous Animal Self (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).  
10 DeGrazia, “Self-Awareness in Animals,” p. 206. 
11 See, for example, Mark Bekoff and Colin Allen, “Intentional Communication and Social Play: How 
and Why Animals Negotiate and Agree To Play,” in Animal Play: Evolutionary, Comparative, and 
Ecological Perspectives, eds. Marc Bekoff and John Alexander Byers (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998): 97-114; and Mark Bekoff and Colin Allen, “Animal Play and the Evolution of Morality: 




advantage.12 This makes it apparent that animals are agents who, by acting, determine 
the course of their own lives in various important respects.  
Crucially, we want to claim that in virtue of possessing these agential 
capacities, nonhuman animals have a significant interest in determining what 
happens in a variety of domains, and so in being able to exert control over the contents 
of their lived experience.13 To begin, it seems relatively straightforward that animals 
have an instrumental interest in self-determination. Being free to pursue their own 
ends means not experiencing the frustration of having their preferences and desires 
overridden by others, and likewise, experiencing pleasure at actively satisfying their 
wants.14 Moreover, individual nonhuman animals are often better placed than we are 
to know whether particular activities or interactions are in their own interest; that is, 
whether such interactions are enjoyable, interesting, soothing, rewarding, and so 
forth. Thus, respecting the wills of nonhuman animals will often contribute to their 
good instrumentally, by serving and protecting other interests of theirs.  
More controversially, however, we also want to claim that self-determination 
has non-instrumental value for animals. When animals are self-determining, it is they, 
through the exercise of their own agency, who shape the contours of their lives. We 
hold that having this kind of control can be an important constituent of a good animal 
life, independent of the benefits or harms that occur as a result of self-determined 
action.15  
Compare the human case. Personal autonomy is good for human beings in part 
because we enjoy actively shaping our own lives, resent the interference of others, and 
are often epistemically privileged with regard to our own good. Nevertheless, the 
value of personal autonomy for humans outstrips the extent to which it realizes these 
goods. This is because we generally think that living an autonomous life is partly 
constitutive of a good life. It matters, for example, that you be the one to choose which 
                                                        
12 Stan Kuczaj, Karissa Tranel, Marie Trone, and Heather Hill. “Are Animals Capable of Deception or 
Empathy? Implications for Animal Consciousness and Animal Welfare,” Animal Welfare, 10 (2001): 161-
173; and Andrew Whiten and Richard W. Byrne (eds.), Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and 
Evaluations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
13 Cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Harm and its Moral Significance,” Legal Theory 18, no. 3 (2012): 357-
398 at p. 382. 
14 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, p. 92. 
15 To be sure, some people hold that personal autonomy is only of instrumental value for humans. 
However, insofar as proponents of this view nonetheless generally recognize robust autonomy rights 
for humans, for a variety of instrumental reasons, we believe that a very similar story can be told for 
many nonhuman animals. Others hold that autonomy is not a constituent of well-being but an 




profession to take up, which relationships to develop, which hobbies to pursue, and 
so on. It matters, as Joseph Raz puts it, that you are the author of your own life.16  
We think a similar story holds for many animals. While differences in cognitive 
capacities are relevant to determining the kinds of valuable options one requires, it 
nonetheless seems plausible that an important component of autonomy’s value is 
located in the free and deliberate exercise of agency by a wilful being.17 In other words, 
while there are sometimes important differences between the cognitive capacities of 
humans and animals, there remains something normatively significant about the fact 
that an “individual has a special, intimate relation to her mind, body, experience, and 
environment that she must especially endure.”18  While the full value of personal 
autonomy or self-determination may only be realized by those capable of long term 
planning and self-reflection, there is no reason to think that these cognitive capacities 
are required in order for it to be in the interest of an agent that they be able to exert 
deliberate control over their experience and environment.19  
This claim receives further support from reflection on the fact that, in the 
human case, self-determination is not only valuable in the context of major life 
decisions, but also when it comes to more mundane and quotidian exercises of our 
agency. For example, we value self-determination when deciding if to engage in 
physical contact (such as cuddling), whether to go for a run, what to have for dinner, 
and when to engage in joint activities like playing games or watching a film. Indeed, 
our ability to pursue or refrain from pursuing such activities represents a significant 
portion of what is protected by autonomy rights.20 Yet many animals can engage in 
analogous forms of decision-making and activity, and plausibly have weighty 
interests in being able to do so without interference. 
Consider Esther, a 650lb domesticated house pig, who likes to spend her 
mornings rooting around in the garden, playing with her toys, and, when it’s warm 
enough, lazing in the sun.21 Plausibly, Esther has significant interests in being self-
determining as she goes about her day. For instance, Esther has an interest in 
determining whether her human companions pet or groom her, when and what she 
                                                        
16 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 369. 
17 For accounts of the value of autonomy that put the exercise of agency front and centre, see Thomas 
Hurka, “Why Value Autonomy?”Social Theory and Practice 13, no. 3 (1987): 361-38; Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom, Ch. 13; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Permanently Demented,” 
in Dworkin and His Critics, ed. J. Burley (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 202-03; and Shiffrin, “Harm and 
its Moral Significance.” 
18 Shiffrin, “Harm and its Moral Significance,” p. 382. 
19 Ibid.; Shiffrin, “Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Permanently Demented,” p.  202. 





eats or drinks, whether she exercises or sleeps, what toys she plays with and when she 
engages in games with her companions. Of course, these choices are quite different 
from some human decisions such as which career to pursue. But again, it is a mistake 
to understand the value of self-determination as only being realised when an agent 
makes such life-changing decisions. For these reasons, and given the variety of 
sophisticated ways in which animals exercise their agential capacities in pursuit of 
their own goals, we submit that many animals have significant interests in 
determining the shape of their own lives. 22   
 
(2) Are animals ever competent? 
 
One might agree that some animals have interests in self-determination, given their 
agential capacities, but deny that they can ever meet the competence condition. 
Perhaps one thinks that other animals are simply incapable of understanding all of 
the material information relevant to any particular choice of action. Thus, given our 
understanding of the right to self-determination, they will always fail to meet the 
second condition for the possession of this right.  
Once again, we disagree. Despite on-going philosophical dispute over the 
nature of competence, one idea that is widely accepted is that competence should be 
assessed relative to specific domains, decisions, or interactions. 23  You may, for 
instance, be competent to drive a car but not to prove complex mathematical 
theorems. Likewise, a patient may be competent to decide whether they will take a 
mild sedative, but not competent to decide on a serious and complex treatment plan. 
This observation undermines an initial source of scepticism about animal competence. 
Even if we assume that most animals will not be competent to judge how to act on 
every occasion or in all situations, it simply does not follow that they are incompetent 
in all spheres of their lives.24  
When, though, is an agent competent? In discussions of human competence in 
the context of medical decision-making, an individual is generally regarded as 
competent with regard to a decision D if they can (i) understand and reason about the 
                                                        
22 The idea that nonhuman animals are autonomous is controversial and some may want to retain the 
label of “autonomy” for those with certain cognitive capacities (e.g. persons). We take no stand on 
this issue. To remain ecumenical, we refer to the good of nonhuman animals in being able to exert 
control over their lives as the good of self-determination.  
23 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics – Seventh Edition (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 115; Allen Buchannan and Dan Brock Deciding for Others: The Ethics 
of Surrogate Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 18. 




material information regarding D, and (ii) communicate a choice or judgement about 
D, that (iii) reflects their values.25 In the remainder of the paper, we will be defending 
the claim that animals can meet condition (ii), despite lacking the ability to give or 
withhold consent. This leaves conditions (i) and (iii). The claim that animals can meet 
condition (i) gains support from intuitive examples. A dog understands the 
information pertinent to whether she wants to rest on the couch or go for a walk with 
her human companion. Similarly, a cat understands the information pertinent to 
whether he wants to be outside in the snow or inside in the warm, or whether he wants 
to be stroked by humans or not. And, in the case of wilderness animals, it would be 
difficult to make sense of their continued survival if we did not acknowledge that 
individual animals are competent agents who navigate a hostile world in a myriad of 
successful ways. Indeed, life is only possible for wilderness animals because they can 
understand the world around them and make appropriate decisions based on the 
information available to them.26 
This leaves condition (iii), the requirement that judgements or actions be 
sufficiently aligned with an agent’s values. Presumably, many would be tempted to 
reject the idea that animals can meet this condition on the grounds that they do not 
have values, perhaps because they cannot critically reflect upon their motives or 
preferences. However, we can admit that animals do not have the same evaluative set 
up as humans without accepting that they cannot meet a parallel version of condition 
(iii). As Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock explain, the reason this condition is needed in 
the human case is that individuals need “to be able to evaluate particular outcomes as 
benefits or harms, goods or evils, and to assign different relative weight to be accorded 
to different values.”27 Yet as we have already noted, animals do possess preferences 
and goals, and act in light of these. Indeed, as Christine Korsgaard has recently 
argued, the world is “valenced” for sentient animals, as it is for humans, because they 
experience things as being good or bad for them and act in light of this 
understanding.28 Thus, even if animals cannot subject their preferences to the same 
kind of reflective scrutiny as most humans, they nonetheless possess a set of values 
                                                        
25 Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso, “The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I,” Law and 
Human Behavior 19, no. 2 (1995): 105-126; Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, p. 
116; Buchannan and Brock Deciding for Others, p. 23. Of course, the precise specification of these 
general conditions is a matter of significant debate. Here we rely on an intuitive understanding of the 
conditions. 
26 Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, pp. 175-176. 
27 Buchannan and Brock Deciding for Others, p. 25. 
28 Christine Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), pp. 20-21. See also Joseph Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment (Cambridge: 




(or “quasi-values”) that enable them to evaluate outcomes as benefits or harms to 
them and act accordingly. 
 
II. Nonhuman Animal Consent? 
 
In light of the preceding discussion, we conclude that there is a strong case for the 
claim that animals sometimes possess rights to self-determination. These rights will 
generally be less expansive than those possessed by competent human adults, because 
the contexts in which the specified conditions are met will be more limited, but they 
are no less important for that. If this is correct, then we must consider the question of 
how we can interact with animals in a way that respects these rights. 
In the context of human relations we frequently rely on the power of consent 
as a means of interacting while respecting one another’s rights to self-determination. 
Indeed, the idea that competent agents have the authority to make certain decisions 
about their own lives is central to understanding the normative significance of 
consent. When a competent adult has the power to give or withhold consent, they 
have the final say over whether or not they release others from certain duties owed to 
them, thereby exercising normative control over the permissibility of a range of 
interactions.29 
If animals are capable of communicating their preferences to us, perhaps we 
can understand such communications as the giving and withholding consent. Mark 
Rowlands suggests, for example, that we can understand a dog’s enthusiastic 
response to the question “Do you want to go for a walk?” as consent to going out 
walking, and her sitting down and refusing to move when she realises how hot it is 
outside as the withdrawal of consent.30 If it were true that animals gave and withdrew 
consent in something like this manner, we would have a simple answer to the question 
of how we can interact with them while respecting their rights to self-determination. 
 However, we reject the claim that animals possess the capacity to give and 
withhold consent. Unsurprisingly, we are not the first to take this position. Yet our 
reasons differ from standard accounts; a fact that is important for our argument. 
Several philosophers have suggested that animals cannot give consent “because they 
cannot be informed in the relevant way.”31 But as we pointed out in the previous 
section, intuitively, there are contexts in which animals understand the relevant 
                                                        
29 Neil Manson, "Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account," Philosophical Studies 173 
(12): 3317-3334, at pp. 3329-3330. 
30 Rowlands, Animal Rights, pp. 88-9. 




information. For example, a dog will generally understand the information pertinent 
to whether she wants to go out for a walk in the sun, or stay behind and rest in her 
favourite shady spot. Even so, she is still incapable of giving her human companion 
consent. Why is this?  
Consent is an example of a normative power. Normative powers enable 
individuals to intentionally and directly alter rights and duties that apply to 
themselves and to others.32 The power of consent enables agents to waive claim-rights 
of theirs, thereby releasing others from duties they owe to them. Thus, valid consent 
will generally make an impermissible course of action permissible because a consent-
receiver will no longer wrong the consent-giver by violating her rights. For example, 
if you consent to surgery then you release the surgeon from her normal duty not to 
operate on you, making it the case that the surgeon will not violate your rights by 
performing the surgery. 
An important feature of the power of consent (like other normative powers) is 
that the power is exercised intentionally.33 Specifically, to exercise the power of consent 
an agent must intend to waive a right and thereby give another permission. For 
example, when you ask me whether you can come into my house, and I say, “Sure, go 
ahead,” I give you consent because I intend to give you permission by doing so. I also 
understand that if I refuse to give you permission then you will be required to refrain 
from entering my house (in normal circumstances) and would violate my property 
rights were you to disregard my lack of consent. Thus, in order to possess the power 
of consent, an individual must have the capacities to know that they have rights, know 
that they can waive those rights, and intend to give permission to others.34 
If consent requires the intentional giving of permission, it is very unlikely that 
we can obtain consent from animals. While it is ultimately an empirical question, it 
seems unlikely that many animals will have (i) the concepts of RIGHT, CONSENT, or 
PERMISSION (ii) the knowledge of the relevant normative facts (e.g. that they have 
certain rights against us, that these rights can be waived through certain intentional 
acts of consent), and (iii) the ability to form and communicate the relevant complex 
intentions concerning such concepts.35 Thus, most animals are unable to waive rights 
by giving consent because they cannot understand that by performing a certain action 
                                                        
32 David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); David 
Enoch, “Authority and Reason-Giving,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2014): 296-332; 
Victor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 205. 
33 Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape, p. 165; Enoch “Authority and Reason-Giving,” pp. 302-03; 
Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes, p. 209. 
34 Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes, p. 211. 




they are hereby giving another permission. Put differently, they do not understand 
that by performing a certain action they are deliberately waiving a moral complaint 
against another’s action.36 
Someone might object that this is an overly demanding conception of consent, 
and that we are therefore unnecessarily excluding animals from the group of agents 
capable of giving or withholding consent. Instead, one might think that obtaining 
consent from an individual only requires that we be appropriately responsive to their 
desires and preferences, something we can do without requiring that they form and 
communicate complex intentions about normative concepts.  
However, there are good reasons to refrain from rejecting the account of 
consent we have outlined. Note that in paradigm cases involving competent humans, 
responsiveness to another’s desires or preferences is not regarded as sufficient for 
consent. For instance, I may fear for my life and want the doctor to perform the 
operation that she says is necessary. However, if I refuse to consent (say, for religious 
reasons), then she will not be permitted to operate. Indeed, this is true even if I hope 
that my refusal to consent will be overruled (perhaps in the belief that by refusing to 
consent I have done all that is required of me), and even if this is clear to those 
involved. Similarly, Mary may strongly desire to have sex with Jack, but if she does 
not consent (perhaps because she is married to someone else), then Jack is not 
permitted to have sex with her. In cases of this kind, it is widely held that responding 
appropriately to an individual’s interests in self-determination requires responding to 
their actual consent or non-consent: their communicated will concerning whether they 
wish to give permission to some interaction. This is so even when there is a significant 
tension between the communicated normative will and the manifest desires or 
preferences. Thus, we require the more robust notion of consent that we have 
articulated, and, on this conception, animals generally lack the capacities necessary 
for giving or withholding consent.  
 
III. Assent and Dissent: Two Tools for Achieving Interspecies Justice 
 
So far we have argued that animals sometimes possess rights to self-determination, 
but cannot give and withhold consent. This combination of claims puts us in 
something of a quandary. How are we to permissibly interact with animals while 
respecting their rights to self-determination if they are unable to give consent and 
thereby release us from the negative duties grounded in that right? Indeed, the 
                                                        





argument so far might be regarded as grist to the mill of so-called abolitionists – those 
who call for the end of all animal use – because our relationships with animals will 
necessarily be exploitative and authoritarian.37 
We think that this abolitionist response is not only unnecessary but also fails to 
be appropriately responsive to animal agency. For example, it fails to take into account 
the fact that animals (especially domesticated animals) often act in ways that express 
preferences for interactions with humans, such as when they initiate physical contact 
with a human, allow a human to brush or bathe them, or express enjoyment at 
undertaking work with a human. Thus, in this section we develop alternative 
normative tools – animal assent and dissent – for determining the scope of permissible 
interactions between humans and other animals. In offering our account, we outline 
what constitutes an act of assent or dissent, when assent is required, and when assent 
is morally transformative. Then, in the following final section, we map this account 
onto our claims about self-determination, and consider some cases in order to draw 
out the implications of the view. 
 
(a) Assent and Dissent 
 
Let us begin with a definition of assent. We will say that an individual assents to some 
act or course of action when they wilfully affirm it. While our usage of the term is 
continuous with ordinary usage, the definition we offer here is partly stipulative. It is 
designed specifically to be of use in describing our moral and political relations with 
other animals and the project of achieving interspecies justice.38 
On our view, wilful affirmation requires observable behaviour that gives us 
reason to believe that an individual desires, prefers, or chooses the option or state of 
affairs. Insofar as animals have limited linguistic capacities and are generally unable 
to verbally communicate their wants and dislikes in language, their assent will be 
made manifest by non-linguistic behaviours. Moreover, the wilful affirmation of 
assent does not involve any intention to waive rights. This means that acts of assent, 
unlike acts of consent, are not performed with the intention of altering the normative 
relationships that an individual stands in with others. Rather, when an agent assents 
to an option, their behaviours manifest an attitude of desire, preference, or choice 
toward that option. 
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To illustrate this idea, let us consider some examples. Karen knows that her 
companion dog, Jay, has been in the car before. She is confident that he understands 
what going in the car involves and she knows that he’s usually a happy passenger. So 
when Karen asks Jay to get in the car and he obliges, we should see his actions as 
expressing assent. Similarly, if Karen suggests that they go for a walk, Jay may indicate 
assent by picking up his ball and meeting her at the gate. Alternatively, Jay might 
assent to being brushed by allowing Karen to do it without too much resistance. Note, 
that even when Jay’s assent is more passive, it is clear that he wilfully affirms the 
interaction because he knowingly – with sufficient understanding of what brushing 
involves – allows it to happen (rather than, say, running away). 
Importantly, what constitutes assent will depend in significant ways upon the 
context. In the previous examples, Jay’s assent takes place against the backdrop of his 
on-going relationship with Karen; a relationship constituted by a series of interactions 
and behaviours. Such relationships often inform the permissibility of how we relate 
to one another. In this case, Karen and Jay’s shared history shapes both of their 
expectations about future interactions and provides them with a greater 
understanding of how to interpret one another’s behaviours. For instance, when 
Karen opens the car door Jay knows this means a trip in the car. And when Jay sits 
alone in the kitchen, Karen knows that he is tired and does not want to be bothered. 
Knowing one another in this way allows Jay to meaningfully assent to activities and 
interactions initiated by either one of them.  
Of course, not all interspecies interactions occur in the context of on-going 
relationships, and new relationships are being forged all of the time. Can we 
understand animals as assenting when there is a lack of shared history, 
underdeveloped means of shared communication and understanding, and where the 
relevant parties have little knowledge about one another’s behaviour and preferences? 
We think that reading animal assent in these cases is often difficult, but it is certainly 
not impossible. There is much that humans can intuit about our fellow animals (and 
vice versa) and in some cases the voluntary affirmation of an option will be very clear. 
Think, for instance, of how humans and domesticated animals who are unfamiliar 
with one another might interact in public. On greeting a dog with whom you do not 
have a pre-existing relationship, it is important that you do not loom over them or try 
to touch them without soliciting their assent first. To do this, you should crouch down 
to their level and allow them to sniff and approach you at their own pace. Depending 
on whether your invitation is accepted (the dog relaxes, tries to engage with you etc.), 




In general, humans in new interactions or relationships with other animals 
ought to proceed with caution.  It is vital, for instance, that humans do not infer assent 
from their experiences with other like animals, and we must be sensitive to what the 
individual is communicating to us through their actions and behaviour. Furthermore, 
whether it is appropriate to regard particular forms of behaviour as manifesting assent 
will depend upon the nature of the activity or intervention in question. Where more 
weighty interests are at stake, we will require stronger evidence that an animal 
wilfully affirms this course of action. For example, while passive indifference may 
sometimes suffice as evidence of an animal’s assent to being stroked, it will not suffice 
as evidence of assent to having their bodies used in more intrusive ways, such as for 
sport (e.g. being ridden by humans), work (e.g. being asked to labour for humans), or 
entertainment (e.g. being asked to perform physically demanding ‘tricks’ for human 
enjoyment). 
Importantly, however, soliciting assent from a animal is not necessarily about 
observing enjoyment or happiness (although it can be). Rather the solicitation of 
assent should be regarded in the same way as the solicitation of consent: it provides 
the agent with the opportunity to make decisions about things that affect them and 
leaves it to them whether they choose to accept what is offered.39 As with consent, 
assent does not necessarily imply great enjoyment or positive attitudes toward the 
interaction in question. (Think, for example, of appointments with the dentist.) It 
rather implies that the will of the agent in question is appropriately oriented toward 
the interaction in question. Like humans, other animals have an interest in being able 
to express indifference, reluctance and tolerance while also affirming certain 
interactions, activities, or states of affairs. For example, a dog may reluctantly assent 
to a bath in order to avoid being banished to the kitchen.40 Thus, animals can assent to 
some act or course of action by actively affirming it or, at least in some cases, passively 
allowing it. 
In discussions of assent in medical ethics, many people find the idea of 
acquiescence as a mode of assent troubling. One serious concern is that vulnerable 
individuals may be too frightened or traumatized to dissent, and so their acquiescence 
to some state of affairs ought not to be taken to indicate assent. These worries are not 
without force, especially when viewed in the context of potentially harmful 
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biomedical research. 41  Furthermore, as mentioned above, the more important the 
interests at stake, the greater the need for positive affirmation; acquiescence in some 
circumstances is simply not enough. However, just as one can consent without 
enthusiasm, it seems plausible that one can also assent without enthusiasm or 
enjoyment. We, of course, need to be sensitive to why an animal is indifferent, 
reluctant, or tolerant of some activity or interaction, and we may have reason to doubt 
that their assent in meaningful. But this does not mean that there is no scope for 
meaningful assent that is established without enthusiasm and absent any sense of joy.  
If it is possible to manifest assent to an activity or state of affairs without 
manifesting enthusiasm for it, then dissent must generally be understood as something 
stronger than a lack of enthusiasm. (Though again, as with assent, what precisely 
should be regarded as constituting dissent will be context-sensitive, and in some cases 
a lack of enthusiasm may suffice.) In the central cases, we propose that dissent is 
registered by forms of active resistance such as physical struggle, hiding, a refusal to 
go along with something, or the avoidance of certain interactions or activities. Dissent, 
then, is the opposite of assent: it is a refusal to affirm some invitation, activity, or state 
of affairs. Like assent, dissent expresses the preferences of the agent; unlike assent, 
dissent corresponds with some affective experience of displeasure or disavowal. 
Finally, like assent, dissent is morally significant. Where an animal has a right to self-
determination and expresses dissent to some activity or interaction A, then we will 
violate their rights by going ahead and A-ing. 
 
(b) When must assent be obtained? 
 
With this initial sketch of assent in place, we can now ask when assent must be 
obtained. Not all situations in which animals make choices, or where we make 
decisions that affect their lives, demand that we obtain their assent.  
As with consent in the context of adult humans, the most general thing that we 
can say is that we ought to obtain assent whenever animals have a right to self-
determination. Thus, a full account of assent-apt situations would require a near full 
account of when animals have these rights. For present purposes, however, we do not 
need such an account to make progress. Rather (and once again, as with consent), we 
can instead rely on some illustrative examples. Return to the case of Esther the pig. It 
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is very plausible that Esther’s rights to self-determination include rights against 
humans petting her, pushing or pulling her to get her to move, and grooming her, 
unless she assents to these interactions. Likewise, if Esther makes it clear that she does 
not want to play right now (perhaps by sitting resolutely on her bed), then she has a 
right that her human companions do not try to force her to play, and they will wrong 
her by doing so. Instead, Esther’s human companions must wait until she assents to 
play. When Esther does assent to an activity or invitation, then her human 
companions can permissibly proceed without violating her rights. 
 
(c) Validity conditions 
 
So far we have said that assent is a non-linguistically communicated affirmation of 
some activity or course of action, which must be obtained by humans in circumstances 
where they wish to act in ways that would otherwise violate the rights of their 
nonhuman fellows. As with consent, not all acts of assent should be regarded as 
morally transformative. Rather, for an act of assent to be morally transformative, it 
must meet certain validity conditions. Specifically, a particular act of assent is morally 
transformative if and only if it is proffered voluntarily and with sufficient understanding. 
In the most general terms, this means that assent is only valid when there are genuine 
opportunities to dissent and it is not solicited under threat of violence or deprivation. 
It also means that assent is only valid when humans have a justified belief that the 
animal(s) that they wish to interact with understands what they are being asked to 
assent to. 
 The range of contexts in which assent might be sought is indefinitely varied, 
making it difficult to characterize these conditions in a general, yet informative way. 
This means that a full discussion of these conditions, while very much needed, is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, there are a few things that we want to note. 
First, the weightier the interests at stake, the more demanding the validity conditions 
are likely to be. In general, humans must be confident that the animal whom they are 
seeking to interact with freely volunteers and understands what is being asked of 
them, but when weightier interests are at stake the burden of proof is higher.  
Second, being able to know that a particular animal meets the two conditions 
in a given context will likely depend upon how well the animal(s) are known to the 
human(s) involved. This is of particular importance for the sufficient understanding 
condition. Someone who spends a lot of time with a companion animal is much more 
likely to know what their companion knows or understands, as compared with 




that Jay knows that an open passenger door means a trip in the car, a stranger will 
not.  
Third, the fact that an animal lacks sufficient information to give valid assent 
does not mean that they are not competent to make decisions in this area. Rather, they 
are like a patient sitting in the doctor’s office before a medical procedure has been 
explained to them. In that case, the patient has the capacity to understand the relevant 
information and make an authoritative decision about whether to consent, but they 
cannot give valid consent until the relevant information has been communicated to 
them. Similarly, an animal may have the capacity to make decisions in some sphere of 
their life but not yet have access to information about a particular situation in that 
sphere that would make their assent or dissent valid. Thus, it does not follow from the 
fact that an animal lacks the information necessary for their assent to be valid, that 
they lack a right to self-determination. Where they have this right they should have 
the relevant information communicated to them when possible. 
There are, of course, many complicated issues here. What evidence must one 
have to be sure that assent is given with sufficient understanding? What level of 
coercion will invalidate assent? Unfortunately, these questions are for another day. 
For current purposes, it suffices to note that animals can give valid assent or dissent 
to interactions or activities when they are free to choose to do so, and when they have 
a sufficient degree of understanding about the options on the table.  
 
IV. Assent, Dissent, and Normative Authority 
 
In this final section, we pull the threads of the preceding discussion together. We begin 
by mapping the notions of assent and dissent onto the idea of normative authority 
and the right to self-determination. We then provide some examples to make the 
implications of our account more vivid. Finally, we consider how we should interact 
with an animal when they have interests in self-determination but lack the 
competence required to have normative authority over a particular sphere or decision. 
As we noted in Section I, if an agent has a right to self-determination in a certain 
sphere then their will is normatively authoritative within that sphere. This right not 
only gives others a reason not to interfere in the sphere protected by the right but also 
serves to exclude from consideration some or all of the reasons grounded in that 
agent’s well-being. Individuals have normative authority in this way when they have 
sufficient interests in being self-determining and are competent to make decisions in 




To qualify as competent, animals must be able to communicate their 
preferences or choices to us. Assent and dissent offer alternative communicative 
mechanisms through which agents can exercise their normative authority. As we have 
seen, assent differs in important ways from the related notion of consent. When an 
agent gives consent she intends to hereby waive a right of hers and thereby give 
another agent permission. By contrast, when a competent agent assents, she 
voluntarily manifests desires and preferences that indicate that her will is sufficiently 
well disposed toward the activity for it not to constitute a rights violation. 
Nevertheless, assent and dissent can, like consent and non-consent, make a direct 
difference to the permissibility or impermissibility of certain actions, actions that 
would otherwise constitute rights violations. That is to say, assent and dissent can 
have the same normative consequence as consent or non-consent. This normative 
consequence is simply achieved via a different normative mechanism.  
On the account outlined above, acts of animal assent and dissent manifest 
wilful affirmation or rejection of an activity or state of affairs. These acts communicate 
animals’ preferences, choices, and decisions. To determine whether a particular act of 
assent or dissent to X is normatively authoritative, we must ask (i) whether a given 
animal has a right to self-determination regarding X, and (ii) whether they are giving 
their assent (or dissent) to X voluntarily and with sufficient information. We have 
already seen that there are many cases in which is intuitive to hold that an individual 
animal should be able to decide whether or not they engage in an activity. If this is 
correct, then we should often recognise animals as exercising normative authority in 
their relations with us through valid acts of assent and dissent.  
To illustrate how we envisage normatively authoritative assent and dissent 
being operationalised in human-nonhuman relations, let’s consider some cases. 
 
Invitation accepted. Ollie is a human who lives with his rat companion Marley. Marley 
enjoys spending time with Ollie and being physically close to him, and Ollie with her. 
When Ollie invites Marley to sit inside his shirt – which involves her being handled 
by him and being in a confined space – Marley assents.  
 
What is important here is that Marley chooses to accept Ollie’s offer (perhaps by 
climbing onto his open hand, or sniffing at his shirt) thereby allowing him to pick her 
up and place her inside his shirt. The fact that Marley accepts his invitation indicates 
that she has a preference for being inside his shirt rather than outside. Respecting 
Marley’s agency means respecting her assent in this instance. 





Invitation declined. Dan has been caring for a stray cat – Hubert – during the harsh 
Canadian winter. Dan invites him to come inside to rest in warmth and get something 
to eat. Hubert knows that he can stay for as little or as long as he likes and that when 
he is ready to leave he need only let Dan know. When Dan sees Hubert in the backyard 
he opens the door and calls to him, and by so doing invites him inside. Most of the 
time Hubert takes Dan up on the offer, but occasionally he does not. Sometimes he 
prefers to sit stoically in the snow. When he declines Dan’s invitation, Dan leaves him 
be. 
 
When Hubert chooses to stay outside, Dan takes his choice to be authoritative. 
Dan believes that Hubert has sufficient understanding of his situation, that Hubert 
has made his choice voluntarily, and that Hubert could choose to come inside if he so 
preferred. As a stray, Hubert is vulnerable to many dangers, but they are a part of his 
day-to-day and Dan is confident that Hubert understands the risks of being outside. 
Dan has no good reason to doubt that Hubert is a competent judge of the situation. 
Moreover, Dan’s belief that the comfort and safety of being inside is better than the 
excitement and freedom of life outside is irrelevant to how he should proceed. All that 
matters, in this instance, is that Hubert expresses his preference to remain outside and 
since he does not accept Dan’s invitation, Dan would violate Hubert’s right to self-
determination if he were to physically restrain Hubert and force him indoors. This is 
the case even though there is a chance that Hubert will be hit by a car, attacked by 
another cat or raccoon, get frostbite, or come up against one of the many other hazards 
in his urban territory.  
 Still, the normative authority of animal action has limits; limits largely 
determined by their competency to make decisions in a given context. In situations 
where animals are constitutionally unable to understand important information about 
why we want to contravene their expressed preferences, and we have good reason to 
override those preferences, it might be permissible that we do so. For example: 
 
Deadly virus. Dan knows that a deadly virus is affecting the local street cat population 
with devastating consequences and that Hubert is at serious risk of being infected 
unless he is vaccinated. The vaccination is not very painful and has no harmful side-
effects, but Hubert will have to be forcibly captured, contained, and handled because 
he dissents. 
 
Assume in this case that the harmful risks associated with non-vaccination will fall 
only on Hubert. Nevertheless, we contend that Dan would be justified in catching 
Hubert and taking him to the vet for his vaccination and that Dan’s actions would not, 




pursuing this course of action, and Hubert is not capable of understanding and 
assessing those reasons. 
As we saw in invitation declined, when Hubert’s actions have normative 
authority, welfare-based reasons cannot be introduced. In deadly virus, however, 
Hubert’s actions lack authority because he cannot understand important facts about 
the situation, and so cannot be classed as competent. Dan cannot explain to Hubert 
what he is going to do, what the vet will do, how it will affect him, and why Dan wants 
to pursue this course of action. Given that Dan cannot communicate the relevant 
information to him, Hubert cannot make competent judgments about the situation. 
Thus, it would be permissible for Dan to override Hubert’s dissent to being placed in 
the carrier and any subsequent manifestations of dissent in the course of having him 
vaccinated and returned to the street.   
This does not mean, however, that Hubert’s expressed preferences and choices 
have no normative weight. In cases where animals lack sufficient understanding to 
have normative authority over their interactions with us, their expressed preferences 
and desires should still be counted in an all-things-considered judgement about how 
to act. That is, animal interests in self-determination (that we described in Section I) 
still affect how we ought to act, and, depending on the context, their will may still be 
decisive in determining what we ought to do.42 
To elucidate, let’s continue examining Hubert’s case. Even though Hubert lacks 
normative authority in this situation, there are two reasons why his expressed 
preferences make a normative difference. The first is that acting in accordance with 
Hubert’s preferences may still instrumentally contribute to Hubert’s good. If Hubert is 
very resistant to receiving the vaccine, then vaccinating him is likely to cause Hubert 
some trauma and discomfort, and thereby set back his interests. This fact is clearly 
relevant to what is best for Hubert (even if these considerations are easily 
outweighed). 
The second reason why Hubert’s expressed preferences should factor into our 
reasoning about what to do, is that, even if Hubert is not competent to make the final 
decision, acting in accordance with his preferences may still non-instrumentally 
contribute to his good. That is, the fact that Hubert gets what he wants may be, by 
itself, good for Hubert. The idea behind this second claim is that, as Daniel Groll 
explains, “the threshold for being…competent may well be higher than the threshold 
for whether one has the kind of will that can nonderivatively play a role in one’s well-
being.”43 So, while Hubert is not competent to make the final decision, the fact that he 
                                                        





would get what he wants if we refrain from catching him and giving the vaccination 
can still constitute one consideration against giving him the vaccine. It is just that, since 
he lacks normative authority in this context, we are permitted to weigh this 
consideration against other considerations of Hubert’s good, including the fact that 
without the vaccine he will likely become ill and die. 
 This is importantly different from the view that we need only consider an 
individual’s welfare interests irrespective of what they themselves want. Indeed, for 
the reasons just outlined, an animal’s will may be substantially decisive even where they 
lack normative authority.44 In such cases the best thing to do for an animal will be, all 
things considered, to act in accordance with their will, even though they lack 
normative authority over the decision. Consider the following:  
 
Sorensen at the vets. The vet has advised Kristin that her companion cat Sorenson needs 
a surgical procedure to correct a non-life threatening medical complaint. Sorenson is 
terrified of the vet and his last visit was very traumatic for all involved. Without the 
procedure, Sorensen will experience some compromise of his welfare interests – he 
may suffer some minor physical discomfort, or limited mobility, for example – but he 
will otherwise continue to have a healthy life.  
 
In this case, it may be that Sorensen’s preferences are substantially decisive. 
This means that Kristin should make an all-things-considered judgement against the 
surgery. Given Sorenson’s fear of the vets and the inevitable distress he will suffer, it 
may be that on balance it will be best for him to suffer some physical discomfort as 
opposed to going to the vet and undergoing the procedure. In such cases, doing what 
Sorensen wills is all things considered the best thing to do because it leads to a higher 
overall level of well-being for Sorensen. So, while Sorensen lacks normative authority 
over the decision – because he lacks the capacity to understand all of the information 




Our aim in this paper has been to consider the normative significance of animal 
agency, and to think carefully about how it should inform and structure our 
interactions and relationships with them. We have argued that many animals possess 
significant interests in having control over the nature of the interactions and activities 
they engage in with us. Specifically, we argued that in those domains in which these 
interests are sufficiently weighty, and the individual in question is competent, these 





interests ground rights of self-determination, which means that their will should be 
regarded as normatively authoritative. When an animal has a right to self-
determination, we argued that we can be appropriately responsive to their will by 
recognising the significance of their assent and dissent. While the details of this 
framework require further elaboration, we hope that this account paves the way for 
the realisation of just interspecies relations. 
 
